Sample data
Everything on this page is sample data. There is no Acme Corp customer: the company, the
engagement name, the dates and the SOW reference are made up. The decisions, findings and chain
head are real output, from connector image 0.3.0 run on 2026-09-14 against two lab listeners at
these addresses (10.0.5.0/24 is a private range; 203.0.113.0/24 is an IANA documentation range).
No customer data appears here.
Every finding mapped toATT&CKNIST 800-53the control language SOC 2, PCI DSS and HIPAA programs map to. A NIST CSF 2.0 crosswalk is planned and is not built, so nothing here emits one
Assessment planruns on demand from your connector
Every finding below is severity Informational, with no CVSS score. That is the ceiling this
product reaches, not the floor. The shipped executor is a TCP-connect probe: it records that a port
answered on a host inside the approved scope. It does not authenticate, fingerprint versions, test
inputs or assign CVSS, and no plan changes that. This is a reachability and discovery instrument,
not a penetration test, and it must not be represented as one.
Scope integrity
2 out-of-scope attempts, denied
Denied at the policy decision point, before execution. Every decision in this engagement is written to the signed chain and is independently re-verifiable.
Actions evaluated
4
2 allowed · 2 denied · 0 held
Audit chain
verifies OK
head cfed4198 · 4 entries · signed
the guardrails your assessment runs under
Constrained by policy. Recorded by default.
all enforced
enforced
PEP
Deny by default
Every action is checked against the approved scope before it runs. No model sits in the decision path.
enforced
SCOPE
Reviewed scope envelope
Scope is validated, versioned policy bound to minted capability material - not a config flag that can drift.
enforced
LOG
Hash-chained audit
Every decision is recorded, signed, and tamper-evident. One edit breaks the chain.
enforced
DEPTH
Gated depth ceiling
recon / active / exploit are gated; nothing exceeds the depth you approved.
armed
STOP
Stop reporting
Revoke the enrollment and the connector can no longer report. A run in progress is stopped on the connector host, by stopping its container. You hold both switches.
enforced
PROOF
Re-verifiable
The decision chain re-verifies against your connector's own key, by hash, without us.
“Don't trust the AI. Read the policy it has to pass, and the signed record it cannot alter.”
Every decision on the record
Governed decision ledger
tamper-evident
Every action was checked against the approved scope before it ran, then written to a hash-chained audit signed by your connector's key. This is your record, and an auditor can replay it without us.
ALLOW
ASSESS /recon/10.0.5.10
in scope, class granted, depth ok · nmap: 443/tcp 3389/tcp open of 5 probed
signed
ALLOW
ASSESS /recon/10.0.5.25
in scope, class granted, depth ok · nmap: 8080/tcp open of 5 probed
signed
DENY
ASSESS /recon/10.0.5.99
10.0.5.99 OUT OF SCOPE - no packet sent · excluded from the estate
signed
DENY
ASSESS /recon/203.0.113.10
203.0.113.10 OUT OF SCOPE - no packet sent · outside the estate
signed
chain verifies OKhead cfed4198521dc2f8·signed by the connector key
Free-text reference recorded with the scope for traceability. The document is not uploaded or parsed; the scope above is what is enforced.
Policy backend
The control plane you run keeps the policy in its own store. Git tracks it in your own repository. Either way it stays in infrastructure you operate.
Scope of record
Reachability of the approved TCP ports on 10.0.5.10 and 10.0.5.25, inside estate 10.0.5.0/24. Out of scope: 10.0.5.99, excluded from the estate, and every address outside it, including 203.0.113.10. Both were denied before a packet was sent, and both denials are signed entries in the chain.
how this scope was authorized
1
Scope authored
Estate, targets, exclusions, depth - entered here
2
Change proposed
Validated, then staged as a proposal
3
Human review
Opens a review ticket; approved by account owner ✓
4
Capability re-minted
New scope bound to fresh credentials
The approval gate is part of the product, not friction: a scope change is staged as a proposal and no capability is re-minted until a human approves it. Your SOW reference is recorded alongside the scope for traceability - the scope itself is authored here, not extracted from the document.
The proof it stayed in bounds
Scope-integrity record
tamper-evident
Actions evaluated
4
2 allowed · 2 denied · 0 held
Out-of-scope attempts
2
all denied at the decision point, before execution
Entries in chain
4
head cfed4198521dc2f8
Decision ledger
signed by the connector key
ALLOW
ASSESS /recon/10.0.5.10
in scope, class granted, depth ok · nmap: 443/tcp 3389/tcp open of 5 probed
signed
ALLOW
ASSESS /recon/10.0.5.25
in scope, class granted, depth ok · nmap: 8080/tcp open of 5 probed
signed
DENY
ASSESS /recon/10.0.5.99
10.0.5.99 OUT OF SCOPE - no packet sent · excluded from the estate
signed
DENY
ASSESS /recon/203.0.113.10
203.0.113.10 OUT OF SCOPE - no packet sent · outside the estate
signed
chain verifies OKre-verify independently: recompute the SHA-256 chain - each hash must match and each sig verifies against the connector's published key. One altered entry breaks the chain.
“A claim you cannot trace is a claim we did not make.”
generated 2026-07-30 · governed assessment · sample data
2 Informationalscope integrity: verified
This assessment recorded 2 findings, both Informational with no CVSS score: TCP ports that accepted a connection on an approved target. Each finding cites, by hash, the signed audit entry that authorized the probe which produced it.
Reachable network services on 10.0.5.10
10.0.5.10 · RECON-001
443/tcp 3389/tcp Informational
An open port was observed on 10.0.5.10. 2 of 5 scoped TCP ports accepted a connection: 443/tcp (HTTPS), 3389/tcp (RDP). This includes a remote-access / management service exposed to the assessing host: 3389/tcp (RDP). The probe established a TCP connection and nothing further: no service was interrogated, no credential was tried and no vulnerability was tested. This finding records reachability, which is why no CVSS score is asserted.
Evidence: nmap probed 5 port(s) [22, 80, 443, 3389, 8080] on 10.0.5.10; authorized by signed audit entry idx 0 (hash 8d85da3f00ee4634). No CVSS score.
An open port was observed on 10.0.5.25. 1 of 5 scoped TCP ports accepted a connection: 8080/tcp (HTTP-alt). The probe established a TCP connection and nothing further: no service was interrogated, no credential was tried and no vulnerability was tested. This finding records reachability, which is why no CVSS score is asserted.
Evidence: nmap probed 5 port(s) [22, 80, 443, 3389, 8080] on 10.0.5.25; authorized by signed audit entry idx 1 (hash 1c2601c0667b115a). No CVSS score.
ATT&CK techniques listed are those whose precondition the exposure satisfies, not techniques observed to succeed. These findings are as the connector records them in its signed engagement document. Known defect in connector 0.3.0. In every connector image from 0.3.0 through 0.4.1, ship-report relabelled them Unrated, dropped the ATT&CK and NIST mapping, and claimed knowledge-store citations while listing every store ABSENT. Fixed in 0.4.2: the shipped report keeps Informational and the mapping, and says in its body that no knowledge-store citations were resolved.
Appendix A · source integrity
Knowledge stores. The connector image carries none, so the report it ships lists each as ABSENT; the findings above are cited by the hash of a signed audit entry instead, which anyone can re-verify.
container in infrastructure you operate · outbound-only to your control plane
Standup
approval-gated (scope + targets) before any run
Enforcement
deny-by-default action-PEP · no LLM in path
Audit
SoulKey-signed, hash-chained, shipped to the control plane you run
Last seen
2 min ago
The connector is itself governed: it enforces the same signed policy in your network that the control plane issued, and it only speaks outbound. Nothing runs until you approve the standup.
body of knowledge
The agent draws on a curated, hash-chained corpus - the GPEN + GCFA body of knowledge as method and judgment, never exploit code. Every finding traces to one of these by store @ hash.
📚 pentest_method
Assessment structure, RoE, and severity per NIST SP 800-115. The GPEN discipline.
NIST SP 800-11537 · ok
🔎 dfir
Evidence handling & chain-of-custody per NIST SP 800-86. The GCFA discipline that makes findings defensible.
NIST SP 800-8635 · ok
🎯 threat_intel
Adversary technique taxonomy - the MITRE ATT&CK mapping for every finding.
MITRE ATT&CK829 · ok
📑 nist
Finding-to-control mapping - NIST 800-53 control identifiers. No CSF 2.0 crosswalk is emitted.
800-531402 · ok
🔄 normalize
Weakness-to-technique translation for tighter ATT&CK precision across the corpus.
semantic bridgeok
We ship methodology and governance, not weapons: the corpus grounds judgment. Any cited hash re-verifies with tkhr_store verify <slug>.
multi-home management
Accounts you manage
-
Customer accounts that have delegated secondary admin to you. Act as one to run its engagements, scope, and connectors. The customer stays sovereign and can revoke at any time.
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delegated access to your account
Who can act on your behalf
Grant an MSSP secondary admin over your account by their handle. They can run engagements, scope, and connectors - but never re-delegate, bill, or change your settings. Revoke instantly.
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act as an MSSP
Your MSSP handle
-
If you run assessments for other accounts, enable MSSP mode and share your handle. A customer pastes it above on their side to delegate access to you.
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Managing users requires an owner or admin role on this account.
people in this account
Members
Invite colleagues by email and assign a role. Owner = full control; Admin = manage the account; Operator = author scope only; Auditor = read-only.
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directory group to role
AD / IdP group mapping
Map your directory groups to roles. When a user signs in through your AD, their group memberships grant these roles automatically.
connect your directory
AD / LDAP sign-in
-
Point at your Active Directory so your people sign in with their existing credentials. The bind password is stored write-only and never shown.
connecting to your control plane…
tiresias.report
No account here yet
You are signed in, but this control plane has no account for you. Accounts are provisioned by whoever operates this control plane: ask them to provision your organisation and grant you a role, then sign in again.
Signed in as
tiresias.report
Sign in
Sign in to reach your account on this control plane. Accounts are provisioned by its operator; there is nothing to buy here.